So, can God make a rock He can't lift? Atheists, agnostics, and those who simply enjoy seeing theists squirm use this question to deny the possibility of God's existence. Most theists avoid squirming by avoiding the question. Others just squirm. But there is another option. There is a simple way to answer the question. In fact, I believe adamantly that God can make a rock He can't lift. Why?
Here's the dilemma posed by the antagonist: If God can make that rock then He can't lift it. If He can lift it, then He can't make a rock He can't lift. Either way, God is no longer omnipotent, and so no longer God.
So why would I claim that He can make such a rock? It's very simple. Because I am a theist (more specifically, a Christian) I believe God is ultimate. (In fact, I believe the ontological argument leaves every person willing to be clear-headed about it with the the fact that there is a God and that He is ultimate--but that's an issue for another day.) He is not subject to anything at all. So any time I have to choose between God and something else, I choose God. So how does this dilemma leave me with a choice between God and something else? It sounds like I am being given a choice between God and God. But I am not.
Here is the real choice, my reason for saying what I do, and the real issue: Whenever I am posed with the statement, "Can God X?" I answer, "Yes." Certainly, some will say "X" must be something in order for the question to mean anything, and in this case "X" is no more something than in the case of "X" being "a round square," or a "four sided triangle." But such an answer will not do. The point of God's omnipotence is not that He can do all things that are rational, or that He can do anything that can be done, but that He can do anything. In fact, it seems necessarily significant to me that God can do what is "impossible" to man, not just regarding salvation (as in Luke 18:27), but regarding anything at all.
So whether I think X is something or not, I still choose to believe God can do it. Where does that leave me? It leaves me saying God can make a rock He can't lift. But doesn't that statement leave me having to say that God can't lift the rock He so made? Not at all. I also believe God can lift the rock. And there's the rub for some, but the key for me. If I say God cannot make such a rock, I contradict God's power. If I say God cannot lift it, I contradict God's power. But if I say God can make it so that He cannot lift it, and that He can lift it, then I make statements which contradict each other, but neither of which contradicts God's power. I am making statements that contradict reason, but not God. Does this mean I believe God and rationality are inconsistent? Not at all. But only one thing can be ultimate. And if I have not learned anything else in my years as a Christian and a student of the Word, I have learned that if I have to choose between what seems rational to me and God, I'd better always pick God.
So where does that leave God and rationality? Right where they ought to be: God first, reason subordinate. After all, God does say to those who are "not my people," "you are my people." God never contradicts Himself. God is not irrational; He is the author of reason. But He often does what reason says cannot be done. Reason works fine when it is seen in subjection to God. But it is nothing less than an assault (though feeble, of course) on God's nature when it replaces God in the minds of its users. In that case, we find ourselves violating the idea behind passages like Isaiah 40:28: "there is no searching of His understanding."
(I have not addressed the moral side of this question, but the answer "reasonably follows" this one! Neither have I dealt with the fact that my view of the supremacy of God is also why I believe libertarian free will is a viable concept. Subjects for other notes...)
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3 comments:
So if you always answer yes the to question of 'Can God X?' Would you answer yes to the exact same questions if X were to be, um I dunno, not exist? Would you answer in the affirmative if I were to ask you 'Can God not exist?'
It would appear that answering yes would not contradict reason, unless first establishing that God must exist, or does exist, or will always exist, but it does appear to contradict God, as you said should not happen. Would you say that God can do anything, even admitting to the point of saying God cannot exist?
While this may be hard for those of us who believe reason and God to be of the equal status, if not identical, how does it fare to one such as yourself who believes reason to be subordinate to God?
Would you contradict what you have said, or would you be truthful and say that you would have to answer yes when asked if God could not exist?
(this is not even going into what the answer would be if I were to substitue X for sin now would it? That would be quite interesting would it not?)
You say there are subjects for other notes? I patiently await to be educated.
Adam
Not too patiently, I see! JK. Glad you commented.
I intend to address both of the questions you raised in future notes. But here are a couple of quick observations to squirt on the conflagration of the issues you raised. The first one (where you say X = not exist) is why I refered to the ontological argument in the blog. I obviously do believe God is necessary. Necessity isn't necessary. Just God. Existence isn't necessary. Just God. If in response to that claim you say it is impossible to speak of God without speaking of Him existing (not like the ontological argument; just in the sense that saying an object is is saying that an object exists) then there's no ability (no power) to attach to the word "can," or "dynamis," and the proposition "God can not-exist" is uniquely meaningless. The question, "does God not exist" on the other hand is meaningful. And that answer is necessarily negative. But that a positive claim about God's existence is negative in this wording also points to the other issue with your first X. Your X should be "exist," not "not exist." I didn't say that the question "can God not X" would always be answered "yes." Although I bet I'm more willing to go that way than you might think.
The other question you raised (can God sin) is what I mentioned at the end of the blog--the moral question. That question deals with divine command theory in ethics and theonomy or voluntarism more generally. And if you're Thomistic, sin is no more positive a claim than "not exist," since sin is a lack of power, not a power. Where I go through those issues is beyond my time and, more importantly, beyond my will tonight. I know those comments are not sufficient (none may ever be) but it's late, and hopefully I'll get to record a more complete statement before I go to India! Thanks again for the thoughtful reply.
You will have to do some more explaining on those answers. Perhaps topics for another day as you say. I think I'm Thomist, if I understand it correctly, yet what do I know? I do believe sin to be a lack of something rather than an actual thing, if that explains it correctly.
India? What fun, I am part indian! Cherokee I think...jk.
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