self, morality, and the incredible shrinking world of relativism

Perhaps the most distinctive and significant feature of any worldview is its conception of the self. For purposes of this argument, the term "self" refers to how people in a cultural group think about what it means to be what is variably called an individual, an ego, a subject, a soul, or even just a human being. Such an issue (how to define the self) may seem trivial or ridiculous to a person with a particular view of self, since no other view than the one commonly held in that culture will even come to mind. But as this argument contends, it is not trivial.

As a starter, for instance, there is an inextricable relationship between views of morality and self. Now cultural relativism is just wrong. It fails both theoretically and empirically--arguments for another day. But the fact that cultures have certain and sometimes variable views of morality (not fundamental, but at least at the practical, secondary level) is undeniable. In fact, any cross-cultural moral criticism requires both the view that morality is ontological and the view that cultures apply, experience, or describe that morality diversely. Further, for cross-cultural criticism to have any weight, there must be some assumption that the moral argument of the condemner is comprehensible to the condemned. One foundation on which that cross-cultural moral criticism can be understood is the concept of self. The meaning of self may not be shared between the cultures. But the relationship between whatever the concept of self entails and morality is most certainly shared. It is at least arguable, and arguably undeniable, that every moral (but not necessarily morally skeptical) outlook derives its claims teleologically from the self. Certainly, virtue ethics is explicitly so, depending almost uniquely on the teleological contrast between man-as-he-happens-to-be now and man-as-he-would-be-if-he-fulfilled-his-essential-nature. But utilitarian ethics depends on the same contrast, using happiness as that essential teleological aim. And Kantian ethics lags not far behind, relying no less on man's essential rationality than the original Aristotelean essence. The point again is not that concepts of self are the same across cultures, but that the relationship between self and morality is the same across cultures, including its teleological nature. This paragraph is not a proof of that claim--just an explanation so that the rest of the argument can be made within the context of its metaphysical and anthropological ethical assumptions.

Now to the point: One of the most interesting distinctions among views of self is between a publicly and privately defined self. For instance, a recent social psychological study focused on the contrast between the will (a central feature of "self") of those in a collectivist society (where the self is defined publicly) and the will of those in an individualist society (where the self is defined privately). In both kinds of cultures, autonomy appears to be at least one key, perhaps the most significant key, to a sense of personal fulfillment--the attainment of the teleological self. One conclusion of that empirical study is that the sense of personal autonomy and therefore psychological wholeness in the self of a collectivist society is different from the same sense of wholeness in the self of an individualist society. In the collectivist context, autonomy is rooted in the subject's ability to bring the self into conformity with the rest of the culture. In contrast, the individualist self often identifies autonomy most profoundly with the ability, for instance, to stand in distinction or even in opposition to the society as a whole. Such a difference may be the result of a difference in motivation at a more fundamental level.

As many authors have pointed out since Michel Foucault, there is also a notable shift in motivational forces between collectivist and individualist societies. In a collectivist culture, the complementary motivators of honor and shame play the key role. In an individualist culture, self-esteem and shame take the lead. Again, not as proof, but simply as explanation, collectivist cultures will appeal to honor and shame directly as ways of coercing or enticing certain kinds of behavior. A quick read through any literature from a collectivist society makes this phenomenon obvious. Basic pleas and arguments are about reputation, recognition, and public reward or punishment, all means of enforcing a cultural pattern of honor or shame. In an individualist culture, such appeals are mostly trivialized. In an individualist context, the opinion of others is discounted in favor of what a subject thinks of itself. The basic problem to avoid is guilt. The basic measure of fulfillment is self-esteem. The Psy-disciplines (as Nikolas Rose calls them in Inventing Our Selves) take on the one of the highest roles (if not the highest) in society.

With that said as context, it is possible to move to a quick but significant point on the moral significance of the view of self which is so intrinsic to American life: that is, to the individualist and very private, psychological self. Cultural relativism has become a staple of American thought. Few Americans are willing to admit that they could even pronounce the words "you are wrong" to anyone doing anything in practically any culture other than their own. The reluctance is not about intervention. It is not about the bashfulness of the observer. It is about some kind of invisible but practically impenetrable barrier drawn at the borders of the nation beyond which our moral opinions either cannot or should not matter. It takes a somewhat Herculean appeal to something as appalling as genocide to push a reluctant American into saying that they would offer a condemnatory statement--not intervene; not force change; just be willing to say the words "you are wrong"--to a culture other than their own. To be sure, not every American is so relativistic, but a surprising number are. Such relativism in an individualist society has much deeper ramifications than simply the inability to recognize cross-cultural moral issues. A relativist in America wonders why each sub-culture should be strapped by the moral norms of the dominant culture. Then the question turns to counter-cultural groups with the same result. But, ultimately, there is no possible moral appeal to anything in an individualist society beyond the psychological self. How could relativism in an individualist society produce anything other than the extensional equivalence of solipsism? Each individual is a self-contained, morally sufficient purpose for existence. In such a context, life is not about something else. Life is about being at peace with self, respecting self, loving self. With morality's context already understood as the teleological distinction between the present self and the completed self, cultural relativism in an individualist society with a psychological definition of self inevitably leads to moral claims which can extend no further than the end of each person's nose. Phrases like "follow your heart" and "I have to do what's right for me" become mantras.

It is no wonder then that most people who consider themselves pro-life qualify their position with the final caveat, "but I think each person should be able to make their own choice." (That position is, of course, not pro-life.) Similarly, there can be no surprise that in an individualist society the success rate of marriages is dwindling. After all, in the final analysis performed within such a culture, self-esteem is all that matters. How often have the words "I have to do what's right for me" preceded the decision to leave a long-term marriage in favor of finally building self-esteem and psychological wholeness? Faithfulness to a marriage anything less than personally psychologically fulfilling (in clinically defined ways) makes no sense where personal psychological fulfillment is the final goal of life.

This argument is in no way an endorsement of the publicly defined self. Neither is it a pretense that the psychologically defined self in an individualist society has no redeeming value. Any view of self developed in a fallen world will lead to errors. Obviously, Christians see the self in these ways as well inasmuch as they are part of the culture. But the errors intrinsic to both views mentioned here are easy to see from a Christian perspective. The point of Christianity however is not self (not even self-fulfillment) but Christ. As remote to reality as that purpose sounds to a person who does not know Christ, so real is it to every believer who has chosen to be a disciple. As Christ says it in Matthew 16: 24ff, "Then said Jesus unto his disciples, If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me. For whosoever will save his life shall lose it: and whosoever will lose his life for my sake shall find it."