Textus Receptus:
και μη πτυρομενοι εν μηδενι υπο των αντικειμενων ητις αυτοις μεν εστιν ενδειξις απωλειας υμιν δε σωτηριας και τουτο απο θεου
King James:
And in nothing terrified by your adversaries: which is to them an evident token of perdition, but to you of salvation, and that of God.
Comments:
in nothing terrified: Paul's admonition here is harmonious with his testimony in chapter 4:6-7.
by your adversaries: Literally, the word implies those who are laid out or stretched out against them. The implication of this verse, especially in the context of the next two verses, is that the faithful Christian will have adversaries and occasion to suffer, in keeping with 1 Peter 2:21.
to them an evident token of perdition: Those who oppose the believer will use suffering as evidence that the Christian is wrong, just as the enemies of Christ did at the foot of the cross in, for instance, Matthew 27:39-44.
but to you of salvation: To those who are suffering on account of their faithfulness to Christ, the suffering is not a reason to question and doubt, but a reason to have confidence that they really are being faithful to Christ. John 15:18-21.
and that of God: Whatever adversity would bring terror would be based on transient influences, while salvation comes from the Eternal God. This point is the same one Jesus makes in Matthew 10:28.
Expanded Paraphrase:
Also, do not be frightened by anything coming from those who lie in wait to cause you problems. They think whatever adversity faces you is evidence of your impending ruin. But you see both the adversity and the potential damage from it as a reminder that while whatever you have in this world will perish, your deliverance from the adversity, the ruin, and the world comes from the Eternal God.
Wednesday, March 30, 2005
Friday, March 04, 2005
Philippians 1:27
Textus Receptus:
μονον αξιως του ευαγγελιου του χριστου πολιτευεσθε ινα ειτε ελθων και ιδων υμας ειτε απων ακουσω τα περι υμων οτι στηκετε εν ενι πνευματι μια ψυχη συναθλουντες τη πιστει του ευαγγελιου
King James:
Only let your conversation be as it becometh the gospel of Christ: that whether I come and see you, or else be absent, I may hear of your affairs, that ye stand fast in one spirit, with one mind striving together for the faith of the gospel;
Comments:
becometh: Literally, the word means "worthy" and is also used in Ephesians 4:1 where Paul charges Christians to "walk" in a manner "worthy" of their calling as disciples. It is also used in Colossians 1:10 where he charges believers to walk worthy of the Lord by begin fruitful and 1 Thessalonians 2:12 where he tells the disciples to walk worthy of God. The idea is not that believers can earn their title, but that their goal must be to bring the appearance of their lives into conformity with the reality of the most important thing in their lives.
as it becometh the gospel of Christ: The measure of conformity here is not other believers or a list of rules, but the good news believers proclaim to the lost. In other words, Paul tells disciples to live (as citizens) in a manner that measures up to the message of deliverance and hope they declare to the lost.
whether I come...or else be absent: The content and context of this statement is similar to chapter 2:12. Although Paul is certainly not Jesus, the similarity to passages like 2 Corinthians 5:9 is unmistakable.
one spirit...one mind: This ideal harmony obviously points down five verses to the imperative of chapter 2:2.
Expanded Paraphrase:
But do not depend on my coming alone. Instead, live in a manner that will show your value as those whose lives have been transformed by the good news of Christ. The result of your obedience so motivated will be that whether I am present or not I and everyone else will still hear that you are remaining steadfast in harmony with Christ and each other, united in the purpose of leading people through your testimony toward faith in that good news.
μονον αξιως του ευαγγελιου του χριστου πολιτευεσθε ινα ειτε ελθων και ιδων υμας ειτε απων ακουσω τα περι υμων οτι στηκετε εν ενι πνευματι μια ψυχη συναθλουντες τη πιστει του ευαγγελιου
King James:
Only let your conversation be as it becometh the gospel of Christ: that whether I come and see you, or else be absent, I may hear of your affairs, that ye stand fast in one spirit, with one mind striving together for the faith of the gospel;
Comments:
becometh: Literally, the word means "worthy" and is also used in Ephesians 4:1 where Paul charges Christians to "walk" in a manner "worthy" of their calling as disciples. It is also used in Colossians 1:10 where he charges believers to walk worthy of the Lord by begin fruitful and 1 Thessalonians 2:12 where he tells the disciples to walk worthy of God. The idea is not that believers can earn their title, but that their goal must be to bring the appearance of their lives into conformity with the reality of the most important thing in their lives.
as it becometh the gospel of Christ: The measure of conformity here is not other believers or a list of rules, but the good news believers proclaim to the lost. In other words, Paul tells disciples to live (as citizens) in a manner that measures up to the message of deliverance and hope they declare to the lost.
whether I come...or else be absent: The content and context of this statement is similar to chapter 2:12. Although Paul is certainly not Jesus, the similarity to passages like 2 Corinthians 5:9 is unmistakable.
one spirit...one mind: This ideal harmony obviously points down five verses to the imperative of chapter 2:2.
Expanded Paraphrase:
But do not depend on my coming alone. Instead, live in a manner that will show your value as those whose lives have been transformed by the good news of Christ. The result of your obedience so motivated will be that whether I am present or not I and everyone else will still hear that you are remaining steadfast in harmony with Christ and each other, united in the purpose of leading people through your testimony toward faith in that good news.
Wednesday, March 02, 2005
Philippians 1:26
Textus Receptus:
ινα το καυχημα υμων περισσευη εν χριστω ιησου εν εμοι δια της εμης παρουσιας παλιν προς υμας
King James:
That your rejoicing may be more abundant in Jesus Christ for me by my coming to you again.
Comments:
your rejoicing...for me: Paul speaks of the same kind of rejoicing (or boasting) in 2 Corinthians 1:14. In that passage (verses 12-14), as here, the scriptures make it clear that it is good for believers to celebrate Christ by celebrating each other. Similarly, Paul uses this word again in Philippians 2:15-17 ("rejoice" in verse 16) to say that the Philippians' faithfulness will provide him an opportunity to boast or express his exuberant confidence in Christ.
by my coming to you again: Paul often speaks of his coming, presence, and absence in parallel to the Lord's coming, presence, and absence. That is, as Jesus instructed the disciples about their obedience in His absence (but presence through the Holy Spirit) in John 14-16, so Paul urges Philippian believers to be faithful in his absence as they were in his presence in chapter 2:12. There is nothing more significant about this observation than the fact that every disciple-making believer is a representative of Christ, as passages like 1 Corinthians 11:1 make obvious, and therefore a testimony (good or bad) for God's faithfulness.
Expanded Paraphrase:
I believe God will bring me to you again so that you will overflow with confident joy in Jesus Christ as a testimony to His faithfulness, but as a result of what he does through me, allowing me to come to visit and disciple you again.
ινα το καυχημα υμων περισσευη εν χριστω ιησου εν εμοι δια της εμης παρουσιας παλιν προς υμας
King James:
That your rejoicing may be more abundant in Jesus Christ for me by my coming to you again.
Comments:
your rejoicing...for me: Paul speaks of the same kind of rejoicing (or boasting) in 2 Corinthians 1:14. In that passage (verses 12-14), as here, the scriptures make it clear that it is good for believers to celebrate Christ by celebrating each other. Similarly, Paul uses this word again in Philippians 2:15-17 ("rejoice" in verse 16) to say that the Philippians' faithfulness will provide him an opportunity to boast or express his exuberant confidence in Christ.
by my coming to you again: Paul often speaks of his coming, presence, and absence in parallel to the Lord's coming, presence, and absence. That is, as Jesus instructed the disciples about their obedience in His absence (but presence through the Holy Spirit) in John 14-16, so Paul urges Philippian believers to be faithful in his absence as they were in his presence in chapter 2:12. There is nothing more significant about this observation than the fact that every disciple-making believer is a representative of Christ, as passages like 1 Corinthians 11:1 make obvious, and therefore a testimony (good or bad) for God's faithfulness.
Expanded Paraphrase:
I believe God will bring me to you again so that you will overflow with confident joy in Jesus Christ as a testimony to His faithfulness, but as a result of what he does through me, allowing me to come to visit and disciple you again.
Friday, February 18, 2005
self, morality, and the incredible shrinking world of relativism
Perhaps the most distinctive and significant feature of any worldview is its conception of the self. For purposes of this argument, the term "self" refers to how people in a cultural group think about what it means to be what is variably called an individual, an ego, a subject, a soul, or even just a human being. Such an issue (how to define the self) may seem trivial or ridiculous to a person with a particular view of self, since no other view than the one commonly held in that culture will even come to mind. But as this argument contends, it is not trivial.
As a starter, for instance, there is an inextricable relationship between views of morality and self. Now cultural relativism is just wrong. It fails both theoretically and empirically--arguments for another day. But the fact that cultures have certain and sometimes variable views of morality (not fundamental, but at least at the practical, secondary level) is undeniable. In fact, any cross-cultural moral criticism requires both the view that morality is ontological and the view that cultures apply, experience, or describe that morality diversely. Further, for cross-cultural criticism to have any weight, there must be some assumption that the moral argument of the condemner is comprehensible to the condemned. One foundation on which that cross-cultural moral criticism can be understood is the concept of self. The meaning of self may not be shared between the cultures. But the relationship between whatever the concept of self entails and morality is most certainly shared. It is at least arguable, and arguably undeniable, that every moral (but not necessarily morally skeptical) outlook derives its claims teleologically from the self. Certainly, virtue ethics is explicitly so, depending almost uniquely on the teleological contrast between man-as-he-happens-to-be now and man-as-he-would-be-if-he-fulfilled-his-essential-nature. But utilitarian ethics depends on the same contrast, using happiness as that essential teleological aim. And Kantian ethics lags not far behind, relying no less on man's essential rationality than the original Aristotelean essence. The point again is not that concepts of self are the same across cultures, but that the relationship between self and morality is the same across cultures, including its teleological nature. This paragraph is not a proof of that claim--just an explanation so that the rest of the argument can be made within the context of its metaphysical and anthropological ethical assumptions.
Now to the point: One of the most interesting distinctions among views of self is between a publicly and privately defined self. For instance, a recent social psychological study focused on the contrast between the will (a central feature of "self") of those in a collectivist society (where the self is defined publicly) and the will of those in an individualist society (where the self is defined privately). In both kinds of cultures, autonomy appears to be at least one key, perhaps the most significant key, to a sense of personal fulfillment--the attainment of the teleological self. One conclusion of that empirical study is that the sense of personal autonomy and therefore psychological wholeness in the self of a collectivist society is different from the same sense of wholeness in the self of an individualist society. In the collectivist context, autonomy is rooted in the subject's ability to bring the self into conformity with the rest of the culture. In contrast, the individualist self often identifies autonomy most profoundly with the ability, for instance, to stand in distinction or even in opposition to the society as a whole. Such a difference may be the result of a difference in motivation at a more fundamental level.
As many authors have pointed out since Michel Foucault, there is also a notable shift in motivational forces between collectivist and individualist societies. In a collectivist culture, the complementary motivators of honor and shame play the key role. In an individualist culture, self-esteem and shame take the lead. Again, not as proof, but simply as explanation, collectivist cultures will appeal to honor and shame directly as ways of coercing or enticing certain kinds of behavior. A quick read through any literature from a collectivist society makes this phenomenon obvious. Basic pleas and arguments are about reputation, recognition, and public reward or punishment, all means of enforcing a cultural pattern of honor or shame. In an individualist culture, such appeals are mostly trivialized. In an individualist context, the opinion of others is discounted in favor of what a subject thinks of itself. The basic problem to avoid is guilt. The basic measure of fulfillment is self-esteem. The Psy-disciplines (as Nikolas Rose calls them in Inventing Our Selves) take on the one of the highest roles (if not the highest) in society.
With that said as context, it is possible to move to a quick but significant point on the moral significance of the view of self which is so intrinsic to American life: that is, to the individualist and very private, psychological self. Cultural relativism has become a staple of American thought. Few Americans are willing to admit that they could even pronounce the words "you are wrong" to anyone doing anything in practically any culture other than their own. The reluctance is not about intervention. It is not about the bashfulness of the observer. It is about some kind of invisible but practically impenetrable barrier drawn at the borders of the nation beyond which our moral opinions either cannot or should not matter. It takes a somewhat Herculean appeal to something as appalling as genocide to push a reluctant American into saying that they would offer a condemnatory statement--not intervene; not force change; just be willing to say the words "you are wrong"--to a culture other than their own. To be sure, not every American is so relativistic, but a surprising number are. Such relativism in an individualist society has much deeper ramifications than simply the inability to recognize cross-cultural moral issues. A relativist in America wonders why each sub-culture should be strapped by the moral norms of the dominant culture. Then the question turns to counter-cultural groups with the same result. But, ultimately, there is no possible moral appeal to anything in an individualist society beyond the psychological self. How could relativism in an individualist society produce anything other than the extensional equivalence of solipsism? Each individual is a self-contained, morally sufficient purpose for existence. In such a context, life is not about something else. Life is about being at peace with self, respecting self, loving self. With morality's context already understood as the teleological distinction between the present self and the completed self, cultural relativism in an individualist society with a psychological definition of self inevitably leads to moral claims which can extend no further than the end of each person's nose. Phrases like "follow your heart" and "I have to do what's right for me" become mantras.
It is no wonder then that most people who consider themselves pro-life qualify their position with the final caveat, "but I think each person should be able to make their own choice." (That position is, of course, not pro-life.) Similarly, there can be no surprise that in an individualist society the success rate of marriages is dwindling. After all, in the final analysis performed within such a culture, self-esteem is all that matters. How often have the words "I have to do what's right for me" preceded the decision to leave a long-term marriage in favor of finally building self-esteem and psychological wholeness? Faithfulness to a marriage anything less than personally psychologically fulfilling (in clinically defined ways) makes no sense where personal psychological fulfillment is the final goal of life.
This argument is in no way an endorsement of the publicly defined self. Neither is it a pretense that the psychologically defined self in an individualist society has no redeeming value. Any view of self developed in a fallen world will lead to errors. Obviously, Christians see the self in these ways as well inasmuch as they are part of the culture. But the errors intrinsic to both views mentioned here are easy to see from a Christian perspective. The point of Christianity however is not self (not even self-fulfillment) but Christ. As remote to reality as that purpose sounds to a person who does not know Christ, so real is it to every believer who has chosen to be a disciple. As Christ says it in Matthew 16: 24ff, "Then said Jesus unto his disciples, If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me. For whosoever will save his life shall lose it: and whosoever will lose his life for my sake shall find it."
As a starter, for instance, there is an inextricable relationship between views of morality and self. Now cultural relativism is just wrong. It fails both theoretically and empirically--arguments for another day. But the fact that cultures have certain and sometimes variable views of morality (not fundamental, but at least at the practical, secondary level) is undeniable. In fact, any cross-cultural moral criticism requires both the view that morality is ontological and the view that cultures apply, experience, or describe that morality diversely. Further, for cross-cultural criticism to have any weight, there must be some assumption that the moral argument of the condemner is comprehensible to the condemned. One foundation on which that cross-cultural moral criticism can be understood is the concept of self. The meaning of self may not be shared between the cultures. But the relationship between whatever the concept of self entails and morality is most certainly shared. It is at least arguable, and arguably undeniable, that every moral (but not necessarily morally skeptical) outlook derives its claims teleologically from the self. Certainly, virtue ethics is explicitly so, depending almost uniquely on the teleological contrast between man-as-he-happens-to-be now and man-as-he-would-be-if-he-fulfilled-his-essential-nature. But utilitarian ethics depends on the same contrast, using happiness as that essential teleological aim. And Kantian ethics lags not far behind, relying no less on man's essential rationality than the original Aristotelean essence. The point again is not that concepts of self are the same across cultures, but that the relationship between self and morality is the same across cultures, including its teleological nature. This paragraph is not a proof of that claim--just an explanation so that the rest of the argument can be made within the context of its metaphysical and anthropological ethical assumptions.
Now to the point: One of the most interesting distinctions among views of self is between a publicly and privately defined self. For instance, a recent social psychological study focused on the contrast between the will (a central feature of "self") of those in a collectivist society (where the self is defined publicly) and the will of those in an individualist society (where the self is defined privately). In both kinds of cultures, autonomy appears to be at least one key, perhaps the most significant key, to a sense of personal fulfillment--the attainment of the teleological self. One conclusion of that empirical study is that the sense of personal autonomy and therefore psychological wholeness in the self of a collectivist society is different from the same sense of wholeness in the self of an individualist society. In the collectivist context, autonomy is rooted in the subject's ability to bring the self into conformity with the rest of the culture. In contrast, the individualist self often identifies autonomy most profoundly with the ability, for instance, to stand in distinction or even in opposition to the society as a whole. Such a difference may be the result of a difference in motivation at a more fundamental level.
As many authors have pointed out since Michel Foucault, there is also a notable shift in motivational forces between collectivist and individualist societies. In a collectivist culture, the complementary motivators of honor and shame play the key role. In an individualist culture, self-esteem and shame take the lead. Again, not as proof, but simply as explanation, collectivist cultures will appeal to honor and shame directly as ways of coercing or enticing certain kinds of behavior. A quick read through any literature from a collectivist society makes this phenomenon obvious. Basic pleas and arguments are about reputation, recognition, and public reward or punishment, all means of enforcing a cultural pattern of honor or shame. In an individualist culture, such appeals are mostly trivialized. In an individualist context, the opinion of others is discounted in favor of what a subject thinks of itself. The basic problem to avoid is guilt. The basic measure of fulfillment is self-esteem. The Psy-disciplines (as Nikolas Rose calls them in Inventing Our Selves) take on the one of the highest roles (if not the highest) in society.
With that said as context, it is possible to move to a quick but significant point on the moral significance of the view of self which is so intrinsic to American life: that is, to the individualist and very private, psychological self. Cultural relativism has become a staple of American thought. Few Americans are willing to admit that they could even pronounce the words "you are wrong" to anyone doing anything in practically any culture other than their own. The reluctance is not about intervention. It is not about the bashfulness of the observer. It is about some kind of invisible but practically impenetrable barrier drawn at the borders of the nation beyond which our moral opinions either cannot or should not matter. It takes a somewhat Herculean appeal to something as appalling as genocide to push a reluctant American into saying that they would offer a condemnatory statement--not intervene; not force change; just be willing to say the words "you are wrong"--to a culture other than their own. To be sure, not every American is so relativistic, but a surprising number are. Such relativism in an individualist society has much deeper ramifications than simply the inability to recognize cross-cultural moral issues. A relativist in America wonders why each sub-culture should be strapped by the moral norms of the dominant culture. Then the question turns to counter-cultural groups with the same result. But, ultimately, there is no possible moral appeal to anything in an individualist society beyond the psychological self. How could relativism in an individualist society produce anything other than the extensional equivalence of solipsism? Each individual is a self-contained, morally sufficient purpose for existence. In such a context, life is not about something else. Life is about being at peace with self, respecting self, loving self. With morality's context already understood as the teleological distinction between the present self and the completed self, cultural relativism in an individualist society with a psychological definition of self inevitably leads to moral claims which can extend no further than the end of each person's nose. Phrases like "follow your heart" and "I have to do what's right for me" become mantras.
It is no wonder then that most people who consider themselves pro-life qualify their position with the final caveat, "but I think each person should be able to make their own choice." (That position is, of course, not pro-life.) Similarly, there can be no surprise that in an individualist society the success rate of marriages is dwindling. After all, in the final analysis performed within such a culture, self-esteem is all that matters. How often have the words "I have to do what's right for me" preceded the decision to leave a long-term marriage in favor of finally building self-esteem and psychological wholeness? Faithfulness to a marriage anything less than personally psychologically fulfilling (in clinically defined ways) makes no sense where personal psychological fulfillment is the final goal of life.
This argument is in no way an endorsement of the publicly defined self. Neither is it a pretense that the psychologically defined self in an individualist society has no redeeming value. Any view of self developed in a fallen world will lead to errors. Obviously, Christians see the self in these ways as well inasmuch as they are part of the culture. But the errors intrinsic to both views mentioned here are easy to see from a Christian perspective. The point of Christianity however is not self (not even self-fulfillment) but Christ. As remote to reality as that purpose sounds to a person who does not know Christ, so real is it to every believer who has chosen to be a disciple. As Christ says it in Matthew 16: 24ff, "Then said Jesus unto his disciples, If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me. For whosoever will save his life shall lose it: and whosoever will lose his life for my sake shall find it."
Friday, February 11, 2005
Philippians 1:25
Textus Receptus:
και τουτο πεποιθως οιδα οτι μενω και συμπαραμενω πασιν υμιν εις την υμων προκοπην και χαραν της πιστεως
King James:
And having this confidence, I know that I shall abide and continue with you all for your furtherance and joy of faith;
Comments:
confidence: This word, also translated as "trust" and "persuaded" throughout the New Testament, depending on its context, is important in the book of Philippians. Paul's confidence here is not about his "foretelling" or "foreseeing" the future, but about his knowledge that God will do what is best regardless of Paul's circumstance--hence his confidence that God will finish what He began in the Philippians in 1:6, and that even when Paul is in prison other preachers will become bolder in their preaching in 1:14. So here, Paul reasons that if it is most profitable for him to remain in this world with the Philippians, then that is what God will cause to happen.
abide and continue with you: These two parallel verbs are intended to make Paul's understanding of God's purpose emphatic. The second word (sumparameno) is just a prefixed version of the first one (meno). In other words, Paul is not simply going to remain in the world, he is going to remain in order to be with and beside the Philippians in their discipleship.
Expanded Paraphrase:
But I have confidence in this: I know that I will continue to be in this world--that is, continue to be together and beside all of you--the goal being the benefit and joy you receive from faith.
και τουτο πεποιθως οιδα οτι μενω και συμπαραμενω πασιν υμιν εις την υμων προκοπην και χαραν της πιστεως
King James:
And having this confidence, I know that I shall abide and continue with you all for your furtherance and joy of faith;
Comments:
confidence: This word, also translated as "trust" and "persuaded" throughout the New Testament, depending on its context, is important in the book of Philippians. Paul's confidence here is not about his "foretelling" or "foreseeing" the future, but about his knowledge that God will do what is best regardless of Paul's circumstance--hence his confidence that God will finish what He began in the Philippians in 1:6, and that even when Paul is in prison other preachers will become bolder in their preaching in 1:14. So here, Paul reasons that if it is most profitable for him to remain in this world with the Philippians, then that is what God will cause to happen.
abide and continue with you: These two parallel verbs are intended to make Paul's understanding of God's purpose emphatic. The second word (sumparameno) is just a prefixed version of the first one (meno). In other words, Paul is not simply going to remain in the world, he is going to remain in order to be with and beside the Philippians in their discipleship.
Expanded Paraphrase:
But I have confidence in this: I know that I will continue to be in this world--that is, continue to be together and beside all of you--the goal being the benefit and joy you receive from faith.
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